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Summary 
 
This report summarises the findings from the Northern Consortium on the Impact of the 
Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI). The Northern Consortium was responsible for evaluating 
projects in the north of England. 
 
The consortium evaluated 21 Strategic Development Projects (SDPs) under Round 1 of the 
RBI and found that these SDPs varied greatly in their attributes. There was variation in the 
leadership of the projects along with variation in the demographics and crime problems they 
were addressing. 
 
The Northern Consortium Evaluation developed several new tools for evaluating crime 
prevention initiatives including innovative methods for measuring crime displacement and for 
attributing crime changes to policy interventions. 
 
Using a wide range of data, both qualitative and quantitative the team derived a scoring 
system for each SDP that allowed ranking of success to occur. Whilst this showed variability 
in burglary reduction across the group, it shows success is possible, but there are many 
elements of success, and implementation is a key driver of this. There were also many 
lessons to be learnt by all crime reduction stakeholders including the Home Office, local 
authorities, partnerships and evaluation teams from the work carried out, on how to ensure 
sustainability, cost effectiveness and replicability in the future. 
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1. Evaluation approach  
 
The evaluation of the 21 RBI, Strategic Development Projects in the north of England was 
carried out by the Northern Consortium. This comprised the Universities of Liverpool, 
Huddersfield and Hull and Matrix MHA. The latter was a research and consultancy 
organisation commissioned to undertake a cost-effectiveness analysis of the SDPs. Matrix 
MHA was engaged both by the Northern and Southern Consortia thereby providing some 
consistency in the cost-effectiveness methodology. 
 
The Northern Consortium was led by the University of Liverpool and had a team of 12 field 
workers, each given the responsibility for up to two SDPs plus other thematic responsibilities. 
The latter were essentially specialisms available within the Consortium that could be applied 
across the evaluation to support and reinforce the analysis. Thematics defined for the 
evaluation included Geographical Information Systems, geo-coding and mapping, repeat 
victimisation, data quality, statistical and mathematical modelling, policy analysis and synergy, 
displacement, offender targeting and behaviour and cost-effectiveness analysis. The 
thematics reflected the high level of skill available within the evaluation team. 
 
The evaluation delivered a number of outputs. These included: 
 
• an overarching final report; 
• technical appendices (as a separate volume); 
• Twenty-one individual SDP outcome evaluation reports; and 
• individual case study reports. 
 
Case studies were undertaken in order to cover, in greater depth, some of the issues around 
measurement and analysis that could not be included in the main evaluation report. Topics 
covered included the measurement and analysis of victimisation, re-victimisation and crime 
displacement using disaggregate crime data (focusing on Phase 1 - 27 and Phase 1 - 40 
SDPs), an analysis of the use of publicity in crime prevention, and a case study exploring in 
some depth the cost effectiveness of target-hardening, once again, focused on Liverpool. 
  
The northern SDPs varied not only in their socio-demographic and community characteristics, 
but also in their organisational structures and partnership arrangements.  For example, there 
were small teams with simple structures as in the Phase 1 - 53 SDP (only five partnership 
members) and large teams spread across a number of groups and subgroups as in Phase 1 - 
45 (a steering group, management team, and co-ordination groups). Just under half of the 
SDPs (10) were jointly local authority and police-led; nine were led solely by the police and 
two exclusively by the local authority. 
 
As a group, the northern SDPs also covered a wide range of high crime communities and 
residential neighbourhoods. Some were poor areas but with strong cohesive communities 
(e.g. Phase 1 - 53), others contained relatively affluent populations (e.g. Phase 1 - 52, Phase 
1 - 61, and Phase 1 - 27 SDPs).  Some areas were demonstrably less socially cohesive in 
that they comprised transient populations, contained problem families and a concentration of 
offenders. Several (e.g. Phase 1 - 42 and Phase 1 - 45 SDPs) had high student populations. 
Many had housing problems characterised by poorly maintained, privately rented 
accommodation, hard-to-let properties and in certain areas (e.g. Phase 1 - 50 and Phase 1 - 
51) houses under multiple occupancy. Some were highly accessible to offenders because 
they had good communications and transport links  (Phase 1 - 61, Phase 1 - 42, Phase 1 – 52 
SDPs). (See Table A.1 in Appendix for more details). 
 
All of the projects had conducted some form of research during the preparation of their bids, 
often identifying the most vulnerable victims and the modus operandi (MO) of offenders in the 
SDP areas. The SDPs’ analyses of offenders’ MOs suggested that entry was most frequently 
gained via the rear of properties, which was often facilitated by the alleyways to the rear of the 
houses.  Opportunistic burglaries were believed to be commonplace, and in four SDPs sneak-
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in burglaries accounted for a substantial proportion of crime.  Repeat victimisation was also 
considered to be a problem across the SDPs, and addressing this issue was a common 
theme across the 21 SDPs.  
 
Northern SDPs targeted these problems through a plethora of crime reduction interventions. 
In all, some 179 interventions could be distinguished across the 21 projects with a mean of 
eight per SDP. In practice, the number ranged from 15 in Phase 1 - 62, to four in Phase 1 - 27 
and Phase 1 - 21.  
 
The most common interventions included the use of publicity, the target-hardening of 
individual properties, the gathering and use of intelligence and offender disruption strategies. 
Property storage, witness protection and drug rehabilitation projects were among the least 
common interventions. 
 
Although diverse across a range of criteria, the SDPs were not a scientifically selected 
representative sample of the full range of residential neighbourhoods and burglary reduction 
strategies. They reflected the crime problems and area characteristics of the successful bids 
and in this sense represented a skewed sample. Thus, the extent to which any successful 
interventions can be rolled out more broadly to high crime communities within the north or 
nationally is inevitably constrained by the unrepresentative nature of this group of northern 
SDPs. 
 
Notwithstanding this, the evaluation sought to identify changes in burglary rates within and 
surrounding the 21 SDP areas and to establish how far these changes were statistically 
significant taking into account trends occurring in the remainder of the constituent police force 
areas. Where greater-than-expected reductions in burglary were identified, the extent to 
which these were likely to be attributable to action taken by the SDPs was assessed. The 
results from this element of the evaluation are discussed below. 
 
Attributing greater-than-expected burglary reductions to the presence of an SDP initiative 
would not, of itself, provide sufficient insights into the mechanisms through which SDPs 
impacted upon burglary. Therefore, a series of follow-up questions was identified concerning 
the likely influence and contribution of a number of factors on the observed outcomes. These 
explored how far any observed successes in reducing burglary resulted from: 
 
• specific burglary reduction interventions? 
• management style? 
• contextual factors such as the type of area? 
• the nature and timing of publicity? 
• the community's involvement? 
• the number of partnership agencies? 
• the extent of pre-scheme planning? 
• the existence of relevant non-SDP projects operating within target areas?  
 
Other considerations also featured. For example the extent to which side effects such as 
possible displacement and diffusion of benefit occurred as a result of the initiative, the degree 
to which the schemes were cost-effective and the sustainability and replicability of the 
schemes. 
 
These questions were examined using data obtained from a variety of sources at different 
scales of analysis. 
 
Recorded crime data were obtained on domestic burglary for each of the 21 SDPs, their 
constituent Basic Command Unit areas (BCUs) and police beats and for the BCUs and police 
beats in the remainder of the Police Force Areas (PFAs). These data were compiled on a 
monthly basis and covered a period starting two years prior to the start of the RBI through to 
the end of September 2001. These data were used to identify the number of burglaries 
prevented by each SDP and to measure likely displacement.  Individual records on domestic 
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burglary were also obtained for two of the 21 SDPs to enable micro-level disaggregate crime 
pattern analysis to be undertaken.  
 
Primary data were collected on project management, partnership working and community 
involvement through site visits, interviews and documentary research. These data were 
acquired to inform the process review that explored the quality of project management and 
the efficiency and effectiveness of project implementation.   
 
Four broad concepts were identified as important in project delivery; these were partnership 
working, project management, planning and engagement of the community.  Each of these 
four concepts was broken down into a series of indicators. A five-point semantic scoring 
system was adopted to measure performance on each variable for each SDP. For example, 
the degree to which SDPs involved the community was scored one (very low) through five 
(very high). Totalling the overall scores for the four broad concepts created the overall score 
for quality of delivery. By scoring, in a consistent way, the criteria used in the process review, 
it was possible to translate these data into variables that could be incorporated in the 
quantitative analysis of links between interventions and burglary outcomes. 
 
Additional data were gathered on the nature and timing of SDP ‘inputs’ (e.g. expenditure on 
victimisation surveys, project planning, meetings, transport, publicity and equipment) and on 
‘outputs’ (e.g. locks and bolts installed, alley-gates fitted) for the cost effectiveness analysis. A 
key objective of the latter was to identify the full costs of interventions and SDP programmes 
taking into account matching funding and leverage, the value of contributions in kind, sunk 
costs and other factors. This would enable cost-benefit ratios to be derived and the cost 
implications of replicating successful projects elsewhere to be identified.  
 
Once again, these data had more than one use. Although collected primarily for the cost-
effectiveness analysis, these data could also be used to map out the intensity of 
implementation on the ground (inputs and outputs by time period) for SDPs individually and 
across all 21 schemes. Relationships could then be explored between ‘policy dosage’ as 
measured by intensity and changes in outcomes (e.g. domestic burglary) over time. 
 
One of the perceived problems in evaluating policy initiatives in deprived areas (although, not 
all of the SDPs were located in such areas) is that these tend to be intervention-rich 
environments with an abundance of regeneration and area-based initiatives. This richness 
and diversity can confound any attempts to attribute successful outcomes (i.e. a significant 
reduction in burglary) to an intervention or group of interventions that is subject to evaluation 
(i.e. the SDPs). The extent to which policies operational within SDP target areas were 
‘relevant’ in that they were likely to impact upon SDP intended outcomes, was measured by 
constructing a policy synergy index using data about other policies collected by the field 
workers. Each non-SDP initiative was scored on a number of criteria including the size of its 
budget, coterminosity in terms of its period of operation and its geographical overlap with the 
SDP area, and the extent to which the policy had objectives that were similar to those of the 
SDP. 
 
Social, demographic and land use profiles were produced for each SDP target area from 
Population Census data using a methodology developed by members of the evaluation team 
for profiling areas of high crime (Hirschfield and Bowers, 1997). These data were used as 
contextual factors and informed both the qualitative and quantitative analysis and modelling. 
 
Quantitative methods applied to these data sets for addressing the key evaluation questions 
included: 
 
• regression analysis of the contextual and process/delivery variables against burglary 
outcomes; 
• regressions for isolating the impact of individual interventions on crime; 
• the specification and testing of multi-level models for relating changes in burglary rates to 
the timing and intensity of project inputs and outputs; 
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• the development of innovative measures for measuring displacement and diffusion of 
benefits. 
 
Finally, cost-effectiveness analysis identified the true costs going into each scheme and the 
value of burglaries saved in comparison with costs (the cost-benefit ratio) and break-even 
points (i.e. where savings from burglaries prevented equates with the cost of schemes).  The 
cost-effectiveness results are discussed elsewhere in this report. 
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2. Summary and discussion of key impacts   
 
The method used to identify the number of burglaries prevented or saved that were 
attributable to the SDPs was based on the assumption that if a scheme had no effect on the 
burglary rate in an SDP, then the change in the SDP crime rate should be similar to that 
observed for the police force area. Thus, the question was asked ‘how many burglaries would 
be expected in the SDPs if the crime rate followed the same pattern as elsewhere?’ This 
involved deriving an expected crime rate taking into account trends in the burglary rate for the 
wider area. The calculation involved the following steps: 
 
• identification of change in the burglary rate in the PFA by comparing the PFA rate before 
the inception of the SDP with that after implementation; 
• multiplication of PFA change ratio (i.e. the rate before divided by rate after) by the count 
of crime committed within the SDP in the period that preceded the start of the scheme; 
• deduction of expected number of burglaries from the actual count to produce the number 
of burglaries prevented.  
 
In calculating the reduction for each SDP, the two years before and after the start date of that 
project were used. 
 
The overall reduction in burglary achieved by the 21 northern SDPs was 24 per cent in the 
two years after April 1999, compared to a reduction of 14 per cent in England and Wales as a 
whole. However, when changes over the same period in the police force areas for each SDP 
are taken into account, the net overall saving in burglaries by the northern SDPs was 12 per 
cent. The results from this analysis of change net of PFA trends are shown in Figure 2.1. 
Statistical analysis confirmed that this reduction was significant (p < 0.5), indicating that there 
was an ‘SDP effect’ on the burglary rate.  
 
The 12 per cent net reduction translated into 1,246 burglaries prevented. The aggregate value 
of these, in terms of the cost of the burglaries saved, amounted to £2.6 million. Comparing 
this to modelled input costs of £2.9 million gives an overall cost benefit ratio of 0.89 for the 
Initiative in the north. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Average expected and observed counts for the 21 SDPs 
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
expected count observed count
 
 
Although success was evident for northern SDPs in terms of total net burglaries saved, this 
concealed a wide range of performance, with just two SDPs clearly failing to achieve any 
reduction in burglary.  Table 2.1 summarises the outcomes achieved by northern SDPs and 
places confidence limits on the estimates of burglaries saved. Because of the shortness of the 
time period involved, confidence limits could not be calculated using the variability of the 
quarterly figures.  Rather it was decided to generate confidence limits from a Monte Carlo 
simulation of net outcomes. The details of this methodology are discussed elsewhere 
(Johnson, Bowers, Jordan et al, 2003). 
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Of the 21 northern projects: 
 
• fifteen SDPs (71%) had statistically significant reductions in burglary once the PFA trend 
had been removed; 
• three SDPs within this group of fifteen (Phase 1 - 52, Phase 1 - 42, Phase 1 - 39) each 
had net reductions in burglary of over 30 per cent;   
• four SDPs failed to achieve any savings after the PFA trend had been removed – Phase 
1 - 45, Phase 1 - 49, Phase 1 - 51 and Phase 1 - 50; 
• of this group two SDPs (Phase 1 - 45 and Phase 1 - 49) recorded statistically significant 
net increases in burglary at the 95 per cent confidence level (i.e. they returned a 
significantly poorer performance than that of their respective PFAs). 
 
In terms of cost-effectiveness, ten SDPs more than broke even on costs (benefits exceeded 
costs).  A further eight had positive benefits, but did not break even. The remaining three had 
a net increase in burglary resulting in ‘negative benefits’. 
 
Table 2.1:  Northern SDPs: summary outcomes 
All outcomes are summarised by two years BEFORE and AFTER START DATE (nearest quarter) of each SDP  
 Number of 
burglaries 
    Reduction in 
burglary 
SDP Before After Gross 
outcome 
Low Net 
outcome 
High Gross 
outcome 
Net 
outcome 
Phase 1 – 
52 
881 513 -368 -355 -308 -262 R R 
Phase 1 – 
39 
753 398 -355 -296 -262 -226 R R 
Phase 1 – 
36 
664 412 -252 -208 -173 -131 R R 
Phase 1 – 
42 
325 195 -130 -127 -108 -90 R R 
Phase 1 – 
62 
329 207 -122 -95 -87 -65 R R 
Phase 1 – 
57 
599 386 -213 -113 -78 -53 R R 
Phase 1 – 
37 
316 216 -100 -97 -76 -58 R R 
Phase 1 – 
21 
526 384 -142 -96 -74 -50 R R 
Phase 1 – 
53 
405 273 -132 -84 -65 -50 R R 
Phase 1 – 
48 
367 237 -130 -76 -55 -36 R R 
Phase 1 – 
44 
457 297 -160 -55 -44 -22 R R 
Phase 1 – 
40 
420 316 -104 -68 -41 -19 R R 
Phase 1 – 
54 
323 262 -61 -49 -34 -20 R R 
Phase 1 – 
61 
459 333 -126 -38 -20 -7 R R 
Phase 1 – 
46 
190 158 -32 -30 -18 -7 R R 
Phase 1 – 
27 
556 498 -58 -35 -15 0 R M 
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Phase 1 – 
35 
395 354 -41 -21 0 22 R M 
Phase 1 – 
50 
248 202 -46 -9 0 13 R M 
Phase 1 – 
51 
591 452 -139 -19 8 29 R M 
Phase 1 – 
49 
388 314 -74 0 20 39 R N 
Phase 1 – 
45 
1303 1221 -82 112 183 250 R N 
All 
northern 
SDPs 
10,495 7,628 -2,867 1,758 -1,246 -743 R R 
  
*Net outcome = gross outcomes less police force area trend 
**Estimated 95 per cent confidence interval generated by Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
Criteria of success Explanation Gross outcome Net outcome 
R Reduction Reduction in burglary High est < zero 
M Marginal Reduction in burglary Low est < zero < high est 
N No reduction No reduction in burglary Low est > zero 
 
Although positive impacts were identified in terms of the RBI overall and for individual SDPs, 
this does not rule out the prospect that these were accompanied by some degree of 
geographical crime displacement, crime switch or by positive spin-offs such as a diffusion of 
benefit. In the latter, the effects of successful crime prevention schemes are observed to 
spread into areas or to crime types not subject to interventions and to benefit them 
accordingly. 
 
Displacement was measured by calculating three values for each SDP. These were: a 
measure of scheme success; a buffer displacement measure; and a weighted displacement 
quotient. The success measure quantified the degree to which an SDP was successful or 
unsuccessful at reducing levels of burglary, and the buffer displacement measure looked for 
evidence of displacement or diffusion of benefit to the geographical area surrounding the 
SDP. The weighted displacement quotient was the ratio of these two measures, thereby 
giving an estimate of whether the change observed in the buffer zone was similar in 
magnitude to the reduction evident in the burglary rate in the target area (Bowers and 
Johnson, 2003a). 
 
To investigate whether offenders switched from committing burglaries to committing other 
types of crime  (or whether there was some diffusion of benefit in terms of reductions in other 
crime types) in the SDP areas, crime data were analysed for a number of different types of 
crime. Analyses were conducted to determine whether the change in the crime rate was 
significant.  To do this, for each crime type and for each scheme, the percentage change in 
the crime rate was calculated using data for the before and after implementation periods. 
These were then compared to percentage changes in other beats within the same PFA as the 
SDP. Changes were defined as being significant if they exceeded the average change 
observed across the PFA by around two standard deviations. 
 
Evidence of possible geographical displacement of burglary was found in only five of the 21 
SDPs;  seven SDPs showed evidence of potential diffusion of benefit to surrounding areas.  
The diffusion effects were, in general, greater than the displacement effects. What this means 
is that the size of reductions in the buffer zones tended to be greater than any increases – 
leading to a form of multiplier effect. Significantly, there was little evidence that diffusion or 
displacement was associated with particular types of intervention. 
 
The analyses concerned with crime-switch also produced mixed results, suggesting that, 
overall, this type of displacement was not widespread but did occur in some SDPs. Different 
SDPs were more at risk of some types of crime-switch than others. For instance, Phase 1 - 
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39, in particular, showed significant increases in theft of vehicle, robbery and theft from 
person. In contrast, Phase 1 - 53 appeared to have a particular problem with increases in 
criminal damage, whereas, Phase 1 - 27 suffered from significant increases in theft from 
vehicle. On the other hand, beats in the Phase 1 - 21 SDP showed only noticeable reductions 
in other crime types (including robbery, burglary other and theft from person). This suggests 
that the Phase 1 - 21 SDP caused a diffusion of benefit that led to a reduction in crime types 
other than burglary in the intervention area.  
 
A close examination of change in burglary over time in the SDPs relative to their Police Force 
Areas revealed a statistically significant fall in burglary before anything happened on the 
ground in terms of SDP burglary interventions. The ratio of burglary rates in the SDPs relative 
to those in the PFA remainders by quarter is shown in Figure 2.2. The Y-axis is ratios, (i.e. 
crime rates in the SDP divided by those in the remainder of the PFAs) and the X-axis, 
quarterly time points. 
 
The ratio takes into account background trends (i.e. policy effects and seasonal influences on 
crime) occurring within the PFA remainders. The lower the ratio, the greater the convergence 
between SDP and PFA burglary rates.  
 
Figure 2.2 shows that SDP burglary rates were, on average, twice those in the PFA 
remainders. An examination of quarterly changes in these crime rate ratios reveals an upward 
trend in crime in the historic period prior to SDP action (i.e. in a period up to 8 quarters before 
the RBI) and a downward trend during implementation. However, across all SDPs, a 
significant fall in burglary can be observed in the quarter immediately prior to action on the 
ground  (depicted by a square in Figure 2.2). This observed reduction in quarter – one is 
unlikely to be regression to the mean (i.e. levels of burglary reverting to normal) because the 
crime ratio in the historic period registered a clear upward trend. A plausible explanation for 
this is that the fall in burglary in the quarter prior to implementation reflects the impact, on 
offenders, of pre-scheme publicity – a reduction in anticipation of action or anticipatory 
benefit.  This implies that pre-implementation knowledge of the measures had influenced 
behaviour (Bowers and Johnson, 2003, Johnson and Bowers, 2003b). Although this appears 
to be the case, further research is needed to test alternative hypotheses to explain this 
phenomenon. 
 
If this proves to be the case, the message for crime prevention policy is significant because it 
implies that just by signalling an intention to take action against crime might of itself be 
sufficient to make an impact before any resources are committed on the ground. The 
prospects of using information and, indeed, misinformation in this way may well be an 
effective crime reduction strategy.  
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Figure 2.2:  Ratio between SDP and PFA for before and after time periods, and for the 
quarter prior to the inception of the schemes 
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3. Effectiveness of interventions  
 
Establishing the key impacts upon burglary of the SDPs generates a useful picture of the 
success or otherwise of the RBI in achieving its overall target to reduce domestic burglary. 
However, this analysis does not provide any insights into how burglary was reduced and 
which interventions were most effective. 
 
Isolating what worked, how, and in what context, involved the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Regression analysis, (a technique to identify factors that predict 
outcomes), was used to assess which variables had the greatest impact on burglary and, in 
particular, which were predictive of a significant reduction in burglary.  
 
Multi-level models were used to explore the timing and intensity of intervention inputs (e.g. 
expenditure) and outputs (e.g. number of window locks fitted) on outcomes. This technique 
analyses a combination of variation over time (change per quarter) and space (the 21 SDPs) 
to provide further insight into the mechanisms of change within the scheme areas. Data were 
available for a variety of variables on a quarterly basis, and these included the following: 
 
• the spend per household (input intensity); 
• percentage of the total outputs (i.e. for the entire implementation period); implemented in 
each quarter (output intensity); 
• the amount of publicity used, in terms of the number of different forms of publicity used 
per quarter; 
• the number of partner agencies involved; 
• the number of changes in key staff. 
 
Site visits, observation, face-to-face interviews with project managers, partnership agencies 
and beneficiaries identified good and less than satisfactory practice in project management 
and the effectiveness of the implementation process. Particular attention was given to: 
 
• the extent to which SDPs stuck to their original objectives and timetables;  
• problems encountered, courses of action considered/taken and whether the best course 
of action appears to have been selected; 
• the SDPs’ own views of progress; 
• monitoring change, including changes to the structure, style and quality of management. 
 
The analysis of burglary change, derivation of the likely number of burglaries prevented for 
each SDP, together with the scoring of performance on project management and analysis of 
cost-effectiveness, provided a basis for ranking the 21 SDPs. These factors were used to 
construct a composite index that enabled the 21 SDPs to be ranked in terms of their 
efficiency, cost effectiveness and burglary impact (Table 3.1). The top third of SDPs, in this 
table, could be regarded as  ‘overall successes’, those occupying the middle third were 
‘partial successes’ and those in the lowest third were deemed ‘unsuccessful’. The 
interventions, delivery mechanisms and contextual factors that characterised the most 
successful schemes were identified through a close inspection of the best performing 
schemes. Several of these characteristics (albeit not all) also emerged as significant variables 
in the quantitative analyses. 
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Table 3.1:  SDP success ratings 
 
 Rank on Success criterion (see notes below) 
SDP 
Name  
Net 
burglary 
outcomes 
Cost 
benefit 
ratio 
Quality of 
delivery 
process 
Overall 
sum of 
ranks 
Net burglary 
outcomes 
Cost 
benefit 
ratio 
Quality of 
delivery 
process 
Success 
score Overall rating 
Phase 1 
–21 9 9 4 8 +++ oo +++ 5 
Overall 
success 
Phase 1- 
27 16 16 10 15 oo --- oo 2 Unsuccessful 
Phase 1 
–35 17 17 15 19 oo --- --- 1 Unsuccessful 
Phase 1 
– 36 5 3 4 2 +++ +++ +++ 6 
Overall 
success 
Phase 1 
– 39 2 1 1 1 +++ +++ +++ 6 
Overall 
success 
Phase 1 
–37 6 10 12 9 +++ oo oo 4 
Partial 
success 
Phase 1 
– 42 3 6 9 4 +++ +++ oo 5 
Overall 
success 
Phase 1 
–52 1 2 15 4 +++ +++ --- 4 
Partial 
success 
Phase 1 
– 40 12 7 1 6 +++ +++ +++ 6 
Overall 
success 
Phase 1 
– 45 21 21 21 21 --- --- --- 0 Unsuccessful 
Phase 1 
– 48 8 13 18 13 +++ oo --- 3 
Partial 
success 
Phase 1 
– 57 10 11 17 11 +++ oo --- 3 
Partial 
success 
Phase 1 
– 46 14 12 12 11 +++ oo oo 4 
Partial 
success 
Phase 1 
– 53 7 4 3 3 +++ +++ +++ 6 
Overall 
success 
Phase 1 
– 62 4 5 11 6 +++ +++ oo 5 
Overall 
success 
Phase 1 
– 54 11 8 12 10 +++ oo oo 4 
Partial 
success 
Phase 1 
– 50 18 18 4 14 oo --- +++ 3 
Partial 
success 
Phase 1 
– 51 19 19 4 15 oo --- +++ 3 
Partial 
success 
Phase 1 
– 61 15 14 20 19 +++ oo --- 3 
Partial 
success 
Phase 1 
– 44 13 14 18 18 +++ oo --- 3 
Partial 
success 
Phase 1 
– 49 20 20 4 17 --- --- +++ 2 Unsuccessful 
 
Notes: 
Criteria of success 
Net outcomes: 
+++ Success, significant reduction in burglary at 95% confidence level 
oo   Marginal, no significant change in burglary 
---   Unsuccessful, significant increase in burglary at 95% confidence level 
 
Cost-benefit ratio  Cost benefit ratio = benefits realised over two years/modelled costs 
+++ Success, top 7 SDPs 
oo  Marginal, next 7 SDPs 
---  Unsuccessful, bottom 7 SDPs 
 
Quality of delivery 
+++ Success, top 7 SDPs 
oo   Marginal, next 7 SDPs 
---    Unsuccessful, bottom 7 SDPs 
 
Quality score = rank of sum of 5 scores below: 
Partnership score; project management score; planning score; number of types of publicity; community score 
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Success score 
Sum of success ratings where success = 2, marginal = 1 and unsuccessful = 0. 
 
Overall rating  
Overall success, success score = 5 or 6 
 
   
Table 3.2 identifies the interventions, policy delivery factors and contextual variables most 
associated with significant reductions in burglary across the northern SDPs.  Items in bold 
italics are factors that were significant in affecting burglary through the quantitative analysis. 
Items in plain text are factors identified as important in the qualitative process review, but not 
statistically significant when tested quantitatively. 
 
Table 3.2:  Greatest impact upon burglary  
      
Interventions 
    
• location-specific situational crime prevention (e.g. target hardening) 
 
• stakeholding interventions with stand-alone publicity campaigns 
 
• 100% of planned interventions implemented (none considered implausible) 
 
 
Delivery 
 
• high expenditure per household, high intensity of output 
 
• high degree of partnership working, more partner agencies (when agencies are active) 
 
• above average expenditure on equipment 
 
• below average expenditure on personnel 
 
• strong management structures dedicated manager, ring-fenced time 
 
• stable management (i.e. few or no changes during the project)  
 
• established partnership in place 
 
• strong planning, effective community engagement 
 
Context 
 
• higher levels of owner occupation (affluence) 
 
• low rates of migration/ population turnover 
 
• fewer flats within housing stock; 
 
• fewer males aged between 16 and 24 within the population  
 
 
 
The quantitative analyses showed that the most successful SDPs tended to be those that 
implemented location specific situational crime prevention measures, such as target-
hardening of individual properties, included stakeholding interventions (e.g. residents’ 
associations, accredited tenants’ schemes) that often involved some form of stand alone 
publicity campaign; and, those that publicised the interventions via newspaper articles and/or 
radio interviews (Hirschfield at al, forthcoming).  The latter finding reinforced the message to 
 13
emerge from the temporal analysis of burglary pointing to a likely ‘anticipatory benefit’ brought 
about by pre-scheme publicity.  
 
Another factor strongly associated with success was the intensity with which SDPs 
implemented their interventions (Bowers, Johnson and Hirschfield, 2003). Specifically, output 
intensity, which measured the degree to which each scheme had been implemented at each 
time point (e.g. total SDP output within each quarter), rather than the spend per household, 
was significantly associated with burglary reduction in the multi-level model. This remained 
the case even when burglary trends in the wider policing area were controlled for.  The 
importance of this measure is that it identifies the actual time period that outputs were fully 
implemented on the ground (e.g. the fitting of locks, the installation of alley-gates) rather than 
when equipment was purchased or personnel input was high. Thus, it would appear that 
across the 21 schemes, reductions in the burglary rates were positively associated with 
scheme intensity, with reductions in burglary being most apparent when implementation was 
most intense. Thus, the more intense the activity on the ground, the greater the reduction in 
burglary. This finding accords with the results of the extensive Safer Cities evaluation that 
also found strong links between intensity of action and crime reduction (Ekblom et al, 1996). 
 
In terms of process variables, it was also apparent that the more successful schemes tended 
to be those that involved a higher degree of partnership involvement and had more partner 
agencies. Indeed, periods when a greater number of agencies were involved in SDPs and 
when publicity was used coincided with the timing of burglary reductions.  
 
Surprisingly, schemes tended to be more successful in more affluent areas. Indeed SDPs 
with the greatest net reductions in burglary were distinguished from the other areas by having:   
 
• a smaller share of flats within their housing stock; 
• higher levels of owner occupation; 
• a smaller proportion of lone parent households; 
• fewer males aged between 16 and 24 within the population; 
• lower levels of migration/ population turnover. 
 
The reasons for this are unclear, although, the more intractable problems experienced by 
residents in the most deprived communities, including lower levels of community organisation 
and cohesion, may have made successful outcomes more difficult to achieve. Significantly the 
four least successful SDPs were in the most deprived areas.  
 
In contrast, the analyses revealed that there was no apparent relationship between scheme 
success and a variety of other factors for which an association might have been expected.  
For instance, neither the agency that led the SDP (e.g. the police, local authority), the number 
of changes that occurred in salient staff during implementation, nor field workers’ 
assessments of how well the schemes were managed, appeared to be significant in the 
quantitative analysis. 
 
Importantly, the quantitative analysis also indicated that the presence of other non-SDP 
interventions did not affect the outcome, in terms of net burglary change, in these areas. The 
lack of a relationship between SDP performance and the number of other non-SDP policy 
initiatives is apparent when the rank of the SDPs on the presence of other policies is 
correlated with the three criteria used to measure success. The resultant Spearman's Rank 
correlation coefficient between number of other (non-SDP) initiatives and burglaries reduced 
was  -.004, that with quality of delivery was -.037 and that with the cost benefit ratio was  
-.024; all were insignificant. Thus, the confounding effect of other interventions was probably 
far less of a problem than originally anticipated by the evaluation team. 
 
A number of factors were flagged up as important in the process review or appear to be 
associated with the more successful SDPs just in terms of being ‘common characteristics’. 
However, these did not all emerge as statistically significant in the regression analyses and 
modelling. For example, the process review suggested that the most successful SDPs tended 
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to implement all of their planned interventions, although, despite being tested, this did not 
emerge as a significant factor in the quantitative analysis. The most successful schemes also 
spent proportionately more on equipment and less on personnel. This undoubtedly reflects 
the importance of implementation intensity in reducing burglary (i.e. ‘action’ rather than 
‘words’) that did emerge as significant quantitatively.  
 
Strong planning, robust management structures, dedicated managers with ring-fenced time 
and effective community engagement also appear to be important from the process review.  
 
Changes in management personnel created an unstable environment for SDPs, particularly, 
when project police officers were moved to new posts. However, the quantitative analysis 
showed that the number of changes in key staff during implementation was not significant. 
This is likely to reflect the fact that the more successful SDPs, such as Phase 1 - 21, tended 
to have stronger partnerships, which were more able to assimilate management staff turnover 
without affecting performance.  Thus, unstable management only becomes important to 
outcomes when there is not an established partnership structure to support the project. 
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4. Key issues around delivery and implementation 
 
The evaluation provided insights into the operation and impact of the SDPs during their main 
period of implementation. In doing so, it has been possible to identify some of the 
characteristics associated with strong project management, effective delivery and statistically 
significant reductions in burglary. The links between these were not always straightforward in 
that some projects scored highly on project management and partnership working, but failed 
to impact significantly on burglary. Conversely, others realised significant net reductions in 
burglary but were not particularly outstanding in terms of delivery. However, these were in the 
minority and for most SDPs there were identifiable links between reducing burglary and good 
practice in a number of areas. 
 
Particular attention was paid in the process review to project planning, project structures/ 
partnership working and management and staffing. In terms of project planning, the more 
successful SDPs were characterised by: 
 
• detailed and thorough analyses of their local burglary problem; 
• implementation of all planned interventions within the time scale; 
• effective targeting based on identification of crime hot spots, modus operandi and 
temporal analysis of burglaries; 
• continuous monitoring of progress and retargeting or refocusing of projects where 
necessary. 
 
However, it is often instructive to highlight practices associated with less than satisfactory 
performance so that problems can be avoided in future and partnerships can learn from their 
experience. A number of characteristics associated with poorly planned SDPs were identified 
in this evaluation.  These included: 
 
• targeting resources on a ‘first come first serve’ basis rather than according to risk; 
• being unclear about targets; 
• being too limited or overambitious in the selection of beneficiaries; 
• setting unrealistic timetables to implement complex interventions; 
• having too many diverse goals that could not be implemented within the limited time 
available; 
• overestimating the level of response from local residents; 
• giving no consideration to resources other than bid money; 
• lack of clarity in how the interventions were to be implemented. 
 
Some of the less than satisfactory practices in respect of partnership working included: 
 
• poor communication between the partners; 
• inability or unwillingness to share accurate and complete data;  
• infrequent and irregular meetings; 
• apathy and disinterest among partners; 
• over-large and unwieldy steering groups. 
 
By contrast, the most successful third of SDPs in the north had a partnership arrangement 
that contained members with the authority to make decisions. They had also selected 
partners with the relevant skills to undertake the set tasks and maintained excellent 
communication links. Those partnerships that met regularly and willingly shared information 
were able to sustain the commitment and interest of most members. They were also 
frequently the most effective in project implementation.  
 
Interestingly, several of the more successful SDPs had effective partnership structures that 
were already in existence prior to the development of the SDP. This provided a firm 
foundation upon which the SDP could build. Other practices identified among the more 
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successful SDPs included continuing partnership activity and support throughout the life of 
the SDP and sustained motivation and enthusiasm of the partners. 
 
The management of the projects varied greatly, ranging from managers being completely 
dedicated to a project or to the scenario where implementation was just ‘slotted in’ amongst 
other jobs whenever possible. Some managers were appointed independently, some were 
part of the original ‘bidding team’, and others were only aware of their involvement when ‘the 
bid landed on my desk’. However, in terms of management and staffing there were clear 
differences between the most and the less successful SDPs. The former tended to have: 
 
• dedicated managers with ‘ring-fenced’ time (not necessarily on a full time basis); 
• enthusiastic and motivated managers; 
• well planned and managed personnel changes; 
• freedom for managers to use their own initiative; 
• provision of training, guidance and support. 
 
In the least successful SDPs, there was often a lack of ring-fenced time for managers, poorly 
planned and managed personnel changes and, in some cases, the absence of a strategic 
overview in projects where interventions were managed by different staff or split across 
several agencies.  
 
Issues of good and less than satisfactory practice could also be identified with respect to the 
implementation of particular categories of intervention. Target-hardening was the most 
ubiquitous intervention but was not without its implementation difficulties. 
 
Many SDPs experienced peak periods of intense target-hardening activity followed by lulls; 
greater intensity was particularly apparent toward the end of the project lifetime due to the 
earlier unexpected delays. However, the majority experienced delays of at least several 
months, with some stretching to over 12 months before the needed installation was complete. 
Slow progress by contractors, poor communication between contractor and SDP, difficulty 
obtaining permission from absentee landlords for work to proceed, or difficulty arranging 
appointments with student populations were often cited reasons. 
 
Interestingly, only three projects took into account the time course of repeat victimisation by 
targeting those burgled properties within 24 hours, or a maximum of 72 hours of an offence. 
Where necessary, repeat victims would again be offered further measures with which to 
secure their homes. Several other projects had intended a similar repeat victimisation strategy 
but were prevented through being unable to identify repeat victims accurately. 
 
Despite good progress in identifying ideal locations for installation and carrying out resident 
surveys, the alley-gating schemes proved to be one of the situational measures most 
vulnerable to implementation difficulties. Projects experienced very lengthy delays, although 
progress was largely hampered by circumstances beyond the control of projects rather than 
any technical or administrative ineptitude. A series of legal factors and challenges to closing 
what had been previously designated rights of way proved to be the main stumbling block to 
efficient implementation. Legal and consultation difficulties proved such a time-consuming 
and expensive process that three of the original seven planned schemes were simply 
abandoned by their respective SDPs in favour of redirecting monies into other interventions. 
The remaining projects did eventually deliver (Phase 1 - 42 and Phase 1 - 40 SDPs), although 
Phase 1 - 27 SDP had only installed a fraction of the planned gates at the end of the 
evaluation period with full completion later and Phase 1 - 52 SDP only after the evaluation 
period had elapsed. 
 
The overwhelming majority of SDPs have successfully carried out education awareness 
campaigns, with the majority distributing crime prevention literature or security packs to all 
local residents and/or specifically victims of burglary. Approximately a third of SDPs 
supplemented this with utilising the mass media (local press articles or radio/TV interviews) in 
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their publicity campaigns or arranging a community event, through setting up crime prevention 
stalls selling items or publishing newsletters in which to further publicise the initiative 
 
The implementation of diversionary schemes for projects proved difficult and had mixed 
results. Progress with attendance levels varied considerably across the projects and for 
several schemes eligibility criteria were ill defined, such that the very fact of being a young 
person was sufficient to be deemed ‘at risk’. Those projects that lacked specificity in targeting 
their population tended to merely offer a range of leisure activities deemed sufficient as a 
medium of engagement with young people, without any explicit emphasis on challenging anti-
social and offending behaviours – these were not seen as having a positive impact on 
burglary levels. Others were felt to be effective, either through reduced incidents of anti-social 
behaviour being reported or asserting a likely effect after the period of implementation in 
changed attitudes. 
 
Few projects specifically targeted offenders and these either suffered low take-up rates or 
never got off the ground. For example, there was a very low throughput for an offender-based 
scheme with only six offenders participating compared with an original target of 20. Offender-
based interventions were very resource intensive, making their delivery unrealistic within 
relatively small budgets.  They were also often slow to implement, required a much longer 
time period to evaluate and were difficult to relate to positive burglary outcomes. It was 
difficult to see why they were included in the RBI. 
 
The evaluation also explored the extent to which SDP teams had given thought about the 
future and their succession strategies. The latter provided an indication of the potential for 
projects to sustain their achievements into the future. Long-term monitoring of performance 
and tracking of burglary levels in and around the target areas is necessary to be certain of 
long-term impacts.  
 
Some indication of the likely sustainability of the SDPs’ achievements can be gleaned by 
looking at the succession arrangements and the nature of known effective interventions. Most 
SDPs did not have an ‘exit strategy’ and many have disappeared without setting in place 
structures that would ensure continuing benefits. However, strong partnerships show a 
tendency to survive, or at least to transfer skills and benefits to successor schemes. For 
example, in some SDP areas, the community took on schemes that had initially been run by 
the police. Examples include a business watch radio scheme in the Phase 1 - 50 SDP and a 
CCTV initiative in Phase 1 - 36 SDP. In other SDPs, community ‘coalitions against crime’ 
were reinforced through the formation of residents’ associations and longer-term community 
networks that may well prove durable (e.g. victim networking and community confidence-
building projects in Phase 1 - 37 and in Phase 1 - 62 SDPs). 
Another factor indicative of lasting impacts includes the long lifespan of target-hardening 
equipment. This may last between 10 and 15 years and this, in itself, may help to ensure 
longer-term impacts if it is managed and used properly. Equipment installed in SDPs known 
to have strong and effective management practices is more likely to achieve sustainable 
reductions in crime. 
 
Sustaining interventions into the future are also more likely where there is continuity of 
funding. A third of the northern SDPs managed to secure further funding to continue their 
interventions. Finally, there was some evidence of a continued downward trend in burglary in 
the last quarters analysed (that is up until September 2001). 
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5. Conclusions and lessons 
 
The distinguishing characteristic of this evaluation, compared with other more conventional 
exercises, has been the multifaceted nature of the research approach that has produced a 
diverse body of data and evidence on the context, the performance and the outcomes of 
spatially targeted burglary reduction projects.  The application, within a single evaluation, of 
Geographical Information System-based crime pattern analysis, innovative measures of crime 
displacement and diffusion of benefit alongside multi-level modelling, cost-effectiveness 
analysis and traditional qualitative interview-based techniques is rare, if not unique. The 
added value that such a chemistry of evaluative techniques brings is in the ability to cross-
reference or ‘triangulate’ different strands of evidence. This enables a fuller and more 
comprehensive evaluation of the performance, impact, and costs of policy to be produced. 
 
To make sense of the information, some form of reconciliation or ‘triangulation’ of the 
evidence is necessary. This involves bringing the different strands of evidence together so 
that the likely impacts of the policy and the mechanisms for achieving these impacts can be 
identified. This is not straightforward. Difficulties arise when one piece of evidence, such as a 
statistically significant relationship uncovered through a regression analysis, cannot be used 
to corroborate another, for example, a criterion of project success identified through 
observation and interviews. When applying the high standard of proof demanded by 
quantitative analysis, only a limited number of factors can be stated with any confidence to be 
associated with scheme success.   
 
A relevant issue here is the extent to which one piece of evidence might be used to 
corroborate another. For example, if burglary falls markedly, what would one expect to see in 
other processes and/or outcome measures  (i.e. what would accompany this if the fall has 
been ‘caused’ by the SDP)? If the process evaluation evidence (i.e. an efficient scheme) 
contradicts the outcome evaluation evidence (i.e. no significant impact on burglary) or vice 
versa, how would one reconcile this? 
 
A key message from this evaluation is that the pathways to success and those to failure can 
vary. For example, significant reductions in burglary can be achieved despite an indifferent 
performance on the policy delivery criteria (as seen in the case of Phase 1 - 62 and Phase 1 - 
42 SDPs) or at greater relative cost with a higher quality of delivery (in the case of Phase 1 - 
21 SDP). On the other hand, the quality of implementation and delivery can be high but the 
scheme too costly and unable to achieve a net reduction in burglary. This was the case in 
Phase 1 - 49 SDP where failure to impact upon burglary was accompanied by a successful 
performance in terms of the quality of delivery. To a lesser extent this also happened in 
Phase 1 - 27. In both cases, the outcomes had not lived up to the potential offered by a strong 
or at least adequate quality of delivery. 
 
There are a number of lessons from this evaluation for different groups of stakeholders 
involved in burglary reduction initiatives. There are lessons, not only for partnerships and for 
central government administering crime prevention programmes, but also, for evaluation 
teams undertaking this research in the future. 
 
For partnerships, good planning is clearly needed, but also, given the results of the analyses, 
it is very important to make the most of publicity. This does seem to have an impact on crime 
and can reinforce the effect of situational prevention. 
 
Another message for project managers and partnerships to emerge from the evaluation is to 
aim for swift and intensive implementation. The most effective SDPs were those that were 
most active in converting resources into outputs on the ground and delivering crime 
prevention.  
 
Partnerships also need to be clear about the link between the intervention and the desired 
outcome, in particular, to map out how the proposed activity will reduce burglary. For some of 
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the interventions (particularly those on youth diversion and the intensive supervision of 
offenders) it was difficult to see how they would impact directly upon burglary. It is also 
important, when planning for and implementing measures to enlist the support of relevant 
partner agencies and the community. In some SDPs, apathy and a lack of take-up of crime 
prevention measures by local communities (e.g. the lack of demand shown for free anti-
grease paint in Phase 1 - 61 SDP) were major impediments to success. 
 
A number of lessons can be identified for the Home Office and other government agencies 
overseeing crime prevention programmes such as the RBI. In particular, it is important to 
assess project proposals on how realistic and achievable they are as well as how innovative. 
This does not solely mean how realistic is it that the interventions may be implemented but 
how realistic is it that the interventions will have the desired effect? In other words, is the 
theory sound and is the partnership likely to be doing the right thing? 
 
There is also a need to ensure project management staff are aware of their obligations and 
that projects provide what they have promised to evaluators in terms of monitoring information 
and crime data. Procedures need to be established to ensure that projects comply with their 
obligations. 
  
One problem that emerged was that several SDPs wanted to know how they were performing 
during the implementation phase. However, it was unclear how far the evaluation team could 
share its findings with them or advise them on who to seek advice from. There is need to 
improve channels of communication between the Home Office, the regional government 
offices and projects such as the SDPs and, in the process, to establish clear guidelines for 
dealing with enquiries from project teams and providing feedback. 
 
Lessons can also be identified for evaluation teams. It is particularly important to agree data- 
sharing protocols, data requirements and to assess thoroughly data quality before evaluations 
begin. The Northern Consortium spent a lot of time and effort on data acquisition with very 
mixed results. 
 
There is also a need to produce universal definitions for important concepts (e.g. 
interventions, districts, BCUs, aggregate/disaggregate data, what is meant by “personnel 
costs” etc.). A considerable amount of time was spent, during the evaluation period, on 
developing an intervention classification for all consortia to use. This might have been usefully 
done before the evaluation started. 
 
The evaluation showed the need to synthesise different types of evidence, although the 
methods for doing so are not particularly well developed. Further research is needed on how 
to bring together different types of evidence, particularly, how to reconcile qualitative and 
quantitative findings when they give conflicting messages. 
 
Whilst it is appropriate to use existing analytical tools where available, it is important not to be 
afraid of developing new measures/techniques where none exist. One of the important 
outcomes from this evaluation has been the new measures and techniques that have been 
developed, both on the quantitative side (e.g. for measuring displacement/diffusion of benefit) 
and for the qualitative analysis (e.g. the scoring of process issues). These should be useful 
for future evaluations. 
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Phase 1 - 48 6,492 2,460 1,964 
76.7% 
38 
1.6% 
1,225 
49.8% 
1,064 
43.3% 
378 
5.8% 
1,477 
60.1% 
4,335 
97.6% 
537 
8.3% 
157 
2.4% 
320 
13% 
101 
1.6% 
Phase 1 - 53 6,697 2,639 1,368 
48.6% 
372 
13.3% 
1,728 
65.5% 
681 
25.9% 
395 
5.9% 
1,107 
42.0% 
4,331 
91.5% 
654 
9.8% 
35 
0.5% 
139 
5.3% 
146 
2.2% 
Phase 1 - 51 15,544 6,516 2,413 
34.1% 
4,190 
59.3% 
3,102 
47.6% 
1,041 
16.0% 
1,195 
7.7% 
4,090 
62.8% 
10,902 
93.2% 
2,117 
13.6% 
422 
2.7% 
349 
5.4% 
535 
3.4% 
Phase 1 - 37 4,338 
 
1,882 1,723 
81.9% 
279 
13.4% 
1,296 
68.9% 
165 
8.8% 
277 
6.4% 
1,064 
56.5% 
3,107 
95.8% 
588 
13.6% 
116 
2.7% 
134 
7.1% 
71 
1.6% 
Phase 1 - 57 4,574 1,724 1,150 
64.0% 
214 
12% 
344 
20% 
1,233 
71.5% 
244 
5.3% 
1,292 
74.9% 
3,038 
96.9% 
558 
12.2% 
105 
2.3% 
300 
17.4% 
45 
1.0% 
Phase 1 - 40 8,840 3,428 2,290 
64.8% 
246 
7% 
2,556 
74.6% 
324 
9.5% 
539 
6.1% 
1,649 
48.1% 
6,006 
94.7% 
736 
8.3% 
37 
0.4% 
174 
5.1% 
171 
2.2% 
Phase 1 - 61 17,101 7,691 2,212 
26.3% 
4,041 
48.1% 
5,483 
71.3% 
162 
2.1% 
1,227 
7.2% 
2,379 
30.9% 
7,286 
54.6% 
2,768 
16.2% 
938 
5.5% 
145 
1.9% 
1,427 
8.3% 
Phase 1 - 52 7,062 3,100 1,354 
39.0% 
959 
27.6% 
1,547 
49.9% 
381 
12.3% 
677 
9.6% 
1,507 
48.6% 
4,300 
75.7% 
1,288 
18.2% 
1064 
15.1% 
164 
5.3% 
672 
9.5% 
Phase 1 - 27 7,613 3,317 2,896 
79.4% 
527 
14.5% 
2,334 
70.4% 
95 
2.9% 
614 
7.8% 
1,489 
44.9% 
4,612 
79.3% 
845 
10.7% 
850 
10.8% 
160 
4.8% 
138 
7.1% 
Phase 1 - 50 4,574 2,328 490 
22.0% 
908 
40.8% 
1,249 
53.7% 
12 
0.0% 
398 
7.6% 
1,247 
53.6% 
4,030 
97.3% 
1,005 
19% 
73 
1.4% 
176 
7.6% 
128 
2.4% 
Phase 1 - 35 6,907 3,234 1,583 
46.8% 
578 
17.1% 
1,223 
37.8% 
1,845 
57.0% 
523 
6.9% 
1,974 
61% 
5,092 
95% 
723 
9.5% 
153 
2% 
301 
9.3% 
142 
1.9% 
Phase 1 - 39 9,213 3,332 2,059 803 2,003 642 596 1,842 5,849 828 3330 194 282 
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56.5% 22.1% 60.1% 19.3% 6.5% 55.3% 94.1% 9.0% 36.2% 5.8% 3.1% 
Phase 1 - 42 2063 999 297 
25.7% 
525 
45.4% 
436 
43.7% 
174 
17.5% 
252 
12.2% 
509 
51.0% 
888 
64.5% 
410 
19.9% 
352 
17.1% 
31 
3.1% 
292 
14.2% 
Phase 1 - 21 12104 4762 1,239 
25.1% 
512 
10.4% 
3,237 
68% 
1,187 
24.9% 
733 
6.1% 
1,845 
38.8% 
7,764 
87.2% 
1,280 
10.6% 
203 
1.7% 
292 
6.1% 
562 
1.4% 
Phase 1 - 36 6690 3189 2,142 
66.5% 
894 
27.9% 
1,307 
41% 
773 
24.3% 
505 
7.6% 
2,018 
63% 
4,710 
94.7% 
1,112 
16.6% 
705 
10.5% 
172 
5.4% 
86 
1.3% 
Phase 1 - 46 6149 2058 2,324 
94.4% 
119 
5.0% 
1,269 
61.7% 
110 
5.4% 
401 
6.5% 
1,331 
64.7% 
3,472 
97.5% 
923 
15.0% 
2,773 
45.1% 
189 
9.2% 
175 
2.9% 
Phase 1 - 49 8483 3454 1,670 
46.1% 
855 
23.5% 
950 
27.5% 
2,170 
62.9% 
546 
6.4% 
2,468 
71.4% 
6,347 
97.8% 
844 
9.9% 
31 
0.4% 
322 
9.3% 
190 
1.6% 
Phase 1 - 45 10167 4111 4,129 
89.9% 
385 
8.4% 
2,591 
63.1% 
374 
9.1% 
993 
9.8% 
2,591 
63% 
6,860 
95.6% 
1,600 
15.7% 
2,556 
25.1% 
281 
6.8% 
650 
6.4% 
Phase 1 - 44 10770 
 
4586 1,667 
34.9% 
2,008 
42.1% 
1,960 
42.8% 
1,902 
41.5% 
670 
6.2% 
2,819 
61.5% 
7,614 
95.6% 
1,189 
11.0% 
190 
1.8% 
341 
7.4% 
197 
1.8% 
Phase 1 - 62 5980 2427 1,436 
56.4% 
225 
8.8% 
1,528 
63.0% 
725 
29.0% 
454 
7.6% 
1,146 
47.3% 
4,361 
95.3% 
558 
9.3% 
43 
0.7% 
126 
5.2% 
104 
1.8% 
Phase 1 - 54 6907 2695 1,373 
49.5% 
733 
26.5% 
1,132 
42% 
1,441 
53.5% 
442 
6.4% 
1,501 
55.7% 
4,573 
94% 
536 
7.8% 
51 
0.7% 
285 
10.6% 
173 
2.5% 
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